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COMMENT
HONG KONG'S POLITICAL CRISIS OF JULY 2003
The publication on 24 September 2002 of the Hong Kong Government's
Consultation Document on Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law
was one of the most important constitutional and legal developments in the
short history of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR).' The
three-month consultation exercise on the Document ended in December
after a demonstration on 15 December 2002 of nearly 60,000 people against
the legislative proposal. In response the Government amended the proposal
by giving several major "concessions" on its substance, but rejected the call
for a White Bill - a bill published for public consultation but not yet intro-
duced into the Legislative Council. The National Security (Legislative
Provisions) Bill, designed to implement Article 23, was introduced into the
legislature in February 2003.2
During the Bills Committee's deliberations on the Bill, the Government
agreed to some amendments. However, critics said that the amendments were
insufficient, and in any event the Government's timetable of passing the Bill
in the Legislative Council's week-long meeting beginning on 9 July did not
allow sufficient time for deliberation. Meanwhile, the onslaught of SARS
(severe acute respiratory syndrome, or atypical pneumonia) in March 2003
distracted public attention from the Bill. As Hong Kong began to recover
from the SARS crisis in June, opponents of the Bill woke members of the
public up to the fact that the Bill was to be pushed through the legislature in
early July.
On 1 July 2003, a hot summer day which was also a public holiday mark-
ing the sixth anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China and the last day
of the new Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Hong Kong, half a million Hong
Kong residents took to the streets to demonstrate against the Article 23 leg-
islative exercise and to express other grievances against the Tung Chee-hwa
administration. Surprised themselves by the large turnout, opponents of the
Bill demanded that the Bill be shelved, and planned to organize a rally of tens
of thousands surrounding the Legislative Council on 9 July if proceedings on
the Bill were to go ahead on that day. The SAR Government finally decided
to postpone the Bill - the decision came on the evening of 6 July three hours
after the Liberal Party withdrew from the "governing coalition" of political
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parties in protest against the Tung administration's original decision on 5 July
to give three major "concessions" on the content of the Bill and at the same
time to adhere to the 9 July deadline for the passage of the Bill. On 17 July
2003, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa announced that the Government
would re-open public consultation on the Bill to ensure that its content would
receive broad public support before it is passed into law.
The Government's new approach to this legislative exercise is to be
welcomed. Since the passing of the age of royal absolutism, law has been
understood as the expression of the will of the people rather than the will of
the ruler. A democratic legislative process is essential to the law's legitimacy.
The principal reason why law is binding on the people is that the people have
chosen to make the law for themselves. It would be a flagrant violation of the
democratic principle of law-making for a government or legislature to hastily
enact a controversial law in the face of extremely strong public opposition.
Even during colonial times, when Hong Kong did not have elected mem-
bers in the legislature, the Government practised "consultative democracy"
and aspired to make only laws that received broad public support. Forcing
the National Security Bill through the legislature in the face of the strongest
expression of public opposition to a legislative measure in Hong Kong's his-
tory would have been the gravest political error. It would not only be a violation
of Western principles of democratic law-making, but also of the colonial prin-
ciple of consultative government and of the traditional Chinese principle of
humanistic rule which assumes that "what the people desire, Heaven will
follow" and requires the Son of Heaven to respect the will of the people.
I therefore applaud the Liberal Party's decision on 6 July to withdraw from
the "governing coalition" of political parties and to join the Democratic Party
and its allies in their call for a postponement of the legislative process, which
forced the Government to reverse its original decision. This demonstrates
that at a moment of "life and death" for Hong Kong, Hong Kong's fate can lie
in the hands not of the Central Government or the Chief Executive, but of
legislators and political parties. This momentous event in our constitutional
history marks a victory for reason, for Hong Kong's autonomy, and for
constitutionalism. 4
Imagine the following scenario. Tens of thousands of demonstrators sur-
round the Legislative Council on 9 July. The Bill is pushed through. Given
that such a large-scale expression of the public will against a single legislative
measure is unprecedented in recent world history, the event will receive the
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widest international attention. The perception will be created that the Chi-
nese Government, acting through the Hong Kong Government, is imposing
a repressive law on the people of Hong Kong against their will. This would do
irreparable harm to the reputation of the Chinese Government, and to the
project and reputation of "one country, two systems". It should be noted that
Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bin has already used the 1 July demonstration
as evidence against the viability of "one country, two systems". The idea, to
be impressed upon the minds of hundreds of millions around the world by the
passage of a National Security Bill amidst massive public protest, would be
that "one country, two systems" is a lie in relation to Hong Kong, and it is
perfectly legitimate for Taiwan to resist reunification. Forcing the Bill through
the legislature in Hong Kong would therefore jeopardize not only Hong Kong's
interest but also China's fundamental national interest in reunification with
Taiwan. So long as the national security law is perceived as repressive by the
international community and Taiwan, the damage is already done, even if
there are no prosecutions under the law soon after the Bill is passed. People
will still believe that the law is repressive but is not being strictly enforced for
the time being.
When it made the decision on 5 July to proceed with the second and third
readings of the Bill as scheduled on 9 July 2003, the SAR Government ap-
parently believed that with the three latest amendments, not many people
would join the demonstration on 9 July. This would have been a serious mis-
calculation based on a gross misreading of the sentiments of the people who
demonstrated against it on 1 July. Most of them did not know much about
the content of the Bill, or whether the three latest amendments would have
covered the major issues. They were unhappy at the unreasonable haste in
which the Bill was being pushed through by a small number of government
leaders and legislators who showed nothing but contempt for public opinion.
Given the revelation on 4 July by Mr James Tien, leader of the Liberal Party,
that Beijing did not insist on a deadline of 9 July, people might perceive the
Government's insistence on the deadline as another sign of its contempt for
the views of the public, even where such views had been expressed by such
physical endurance in the heat for long hours by so many people on 1 July.
The "three concessions" might be perceived as bribes offered to appease the
public rather than based on sound legal policy. Indeed, as some lawyers pointed
out already, it was doubtful whether the legal technicalities relating to the
implementation of the three concessions could be ironed out in such haste.
Many respectable and influential leaders of public opinion in Hong Kong
rejected the "three concessions" or "favours" offered in return for the people's
acceptance of a legislative process that had been perceived as hasty, unrea-
sonable and oppressive. Demonstrators in the proposed mass protest on 9 July
would have a more specific objective (voting against the Bill by their feet)
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than those on 1 July. Given these considerations, a big turnout (of the order
of tens of thousands) on 9 July would have been likely if the Bill had not been
postponed. This prediction can be considered validated by the fact that even
after the scheduled reading of the Bill on 9 July was cancelled, approximately
50,000 people still turned out to demonstrate outside the Legislative Council
building on the evening of 9 July to protest against the Article 23 legislative
exercise and to call for further democratisation of Hong Kong's political system.
The Government's original decision to go ahead with the legislative pro-
ceedings on 9 July would have entailed a "lose-lose" situation. I have already
considered (above) the scenario of the Bill being pushed through in the midst
of a mass protest of the largest scale by international standards (as far as a
single legislative measure is concerned), and the loss caused to China's na-
tional interest in the international perception and perception in Taiwan of
the successful implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong.
Consider the alternative scenario, which is that the Bill is defeated in LegCo
in the midst of mass protest. This would strike the most severe blow to the
authority of the Hong Kong Government in Hong Kong and irreparably dam-
age its credibility in the eyes of the Central Government. It may precipitate a
constitutional crisis. It will also create the possibility that Article 23 of the
Basic Law cannot be implemented in the foreseeable future. This is why it is
a "lose-lose" situation (no matter whether the Bill is passed) not only for the
people of Hong Kong, but also from China's point of view.
Consider the alternative course of action that legislators have now forced
the Government to adopt, which is to postpone the final stage of legislating
the Bill. There will be more time for further consultation and for the detailed
provisions of the Bill to be finalised. Given that the Government has already
agreed to give way on the three most controversial sets of provisions that
have aroused the strongest opposition, it is to be hoped that the deliberations
on the Bill in the next few months will be relatively smooth. More than 100
amendments have been proposed by legislators, but compared to the "three
major issues" on which the Government has now given way, the issues raised
by these other amendments should be easier to resolve. The Government
and the legislators concerned can engage in normal bargaining and give-and-
take. I see no reason why, if this process is handled in a competent manner
(from the point of view of the legal technicalities) with rational debate and
an open mind, it cannot result in an amicable settlement. Then there will be
no excuse for a small number of activists to incite massive demonstrations
when the second and third readings of the Bill are conducted. Even if they do
incite such protest, we can reasonably expect that the scale will be small. The
Government's original argument on 5 July that prolonging the legislative pro-
cess on the Bill would prolong the conflict and prevent the Government
from concentrating on Hong Kong's economic development was therefore
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completely unsound. It was the Government's originally proposed course of
action that would create and escalate political and social conflicts in Hong
Kong (completely unnecessarily given the effectiveness
of the alternative course of action mentioned above), which would include
not only a massive demonstration on 9 July but also further and intensifying
conflicts between defenders of the status quo and civil society movements
for rapid democratisation in Hong Kong and possibly for getting rid of the
National Security Law (if passed but perceived as a repressive law) in future.
We can therefore see that postponing the legislative process on the Bill in
this case, plus the three major amendments now proposed by the Govern-
ment and the coerced reversal of the Government's original decision of 5 July
2003, is a victory for reason and common sense. This course of action enables
the crisis precipitated by the 1 July rally to be resolved without the occur-
rence of large-scale demonstrations attracting worldwide attention. I therefore
salute each and every of those legislators who have contributed to coercing
the Government to agree to halt the legislative proceedings on the Bill on
9 July. They have done a tremendous service not only to the people of Hong
Kong, but also the people of China as a whole who have a stake in the success
of "one country, two systems".
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